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ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE UK: 




This paper draws on the work of Streeck and Schmitter (1985) and its subsequent 
use by Puxty, et al (1987) to analyse the development of accounting regulation in the 
U.K. public sector. It provides an extension to prior literature through the application of 
a framework, based on modes of social order, to investigate divergence in the 
approaches to accounting regulation between the public and private sectors within a 
single nation state. Despite the advent of ‘New Public Management’, a different balance 
of the principles of regulation was established and continues to exist in the public sector 
when compared with that applied in the private sector, reflected by their respective 
approaches to due process. The conclusion is that the UK public sector accounting 
regulatory structure remains rooted in the state mode of social order and hence is 
different from that found in the private sector, despite the rhetoric of modernisation 
through the adoption of private sector management practices. 
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ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE UK: 
ONE NATION, TWO SECTORS 
 
The United Kingdom public sector has undergone radical changes in the last twenty 
years through the adoption of organisational structures, management techniques and modes of 
accountability developed in the private sector. This transfer has become known as New 
Public Management (hereafter NPM) (Hood, 1991, 1995) and its accounting and financial 
aspects have been described as the New Public Financial Management (Olson, et al, 1998). A 
consequence of these reforms has been the identification of discreet accounting entities that 
report using accrual accounting methods underpinned by concepts and practices developed in 
the private sector. Its manifestation in the UK central government has been the introduction 
of Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) under the Government Resources and 
Accounts Act, 2000 (GRAA), and, from the outset, these accounts have been advocated as 
providing a ‘more business-like approach’ (Treasury, 1994, p. iii). All central government 
departments, non-departmental public bodies and government agencies have to comply with 
RAB requirements. The full scale of this project may be judged from the size of the estimated 
central government resource budget for 2005-06 of £469.1 billion1. The cost of implementing 
the reforms within individual departments is considerable; for example, Keelan (2001) 
describes the Ministry of Defence alone requiring £200 million and 30,000 man-days of 
training so far to implement RAB. 
Accruals accounting lies at the heart of RAB and it is to conform to generally accepted 
accounting practice, adapted as necessary, and to have regard to guidance issued by the 
Accounting Standards Board (GRAA, sec. 5.3 and 5.4). Whole of Government Accounts 
(WGA) are also to be produced on an accruals basis again using generally accepted 
                                                 
1  Source http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/172/47/pesa2005_complete.pdf p.11, Consulted on 11 January 
2006 
accounting principles, adapted where necessary for government accounting purposes. This 
accounting development is consistent with the idea that, just like a business through its 
directors, or the economy in general through the market mechanism, the government has to 
allocate scarce resources; in these circumstances, it may appear logical to adopt the same 
accounting procedures as those that inform the private sector (for example FASB, 1980; 
Anthony, 1989; McGregor, 1999; IFAC, 2000). An alternative perspective is that the two 
sectors of the economy, public and private, are so different that a single approach to 
accounting standards is not appropriate (for example Jones, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Stanton 
and Stanton, 1998; Barton, 1999). 
The rhetoric accompanying the introduction of RAB and WGA shows that they are not 
seen as passive recording and reporting systems. According to the Green Paper2 proposals 
RAB will enable taxpayers to ‘be better able to see what they are receiving for their money 
and to judge what value for money they are getting’ (Treasury, 1994, p. iii). Internally, RAB 
will assist the government to ‘achieve continued improvement in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the services delivered’ and will benefit ‘the wider perspective of the overall 
planning, management and control of public expenditure’ (ibid.). The White Paper3, which 
followed and built on the Green Paper, advocated RAB as providing the chance ‘to make 
better informed decisions about overall public spending priorities’, resulting in ‘better 
management of public spending’ (Treasury, 1995, p. i). This process appears not to be a 
matter of political contention as it continued seamlessly with the change in government at the 
1997 General Election. The significance of accounting measures as a determinant of resource 
allocation decisions lends further importance to understanding how accounting rules for RAB 
                                                 
2  A Green Paper is a consultation document produced by the Government which is designed to encourage 
debate and feedback both inside and outside Parliament. 
3  A White Paper, produced by the Government, sets out details of future policy prior to possible legislation. 
and WGA are developed and applied. It also raises the question of the extent of public 
involvement in the creation of the rules that underlie the resulting accounting reports. 
The regulation of accounting practices in the private sector is well-researched and it has 
long been recognised that accounting rules are the output of processes that can be viewed as a 
form of political activity, rather than being concerned solely with technical precision (for 
example Gerboth, 1973; Horngren, 1973; Solomons, 1978; Walker, 1987; Fogarty, et al, 
1994). Rather less attention has been paid to how accounting practices are developed in the 
public sector, perhaps because there is no direct wealth allocation effect to motivate powerful 
interest groups such as financial analysts and corporate managers. However the more subtle 
allocative effects of public sector accounting reforms may be no less real than those arising 
from similar private sector developments (for example Hopwood, 1984; Power and Laughlin, 
1992). 
Several broad themes of research relating to the development of public sector 
accounting regulation can be identified (for more extensive reviews see Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992; Parker and Gould, 1999). One approach, in common with studies of private 
sector accounting, has been to adopt a focused (micro-level) analysis of influences on public 
sector accounting using evidence of lobbying activity on particular regulatory proposals. 
Such studies support the argument that accounting practices are contingent upon forces that 
are historically and geographically localised (Miller and Napier, 1993). However Walker and 
Robinson (1993), in their extensive and critical analysis of the lobbying literature, suggest 
that most empirically-based lobbying studies fail to consider the relationship between the 
profession-based standard setting bodies and government regulators; this limitation may be 
particularly important in the context of the public sector where treasury and other 
departments may have significant influence or even effective control of accounting 
regulations. There are no public sector studies included the Walker and Robinson (1993) 
survey of papers published from 1978 to 1992. 
More recently, there is evidence of an increasing research interest in public sector 
accounting regulation as countries seek to adapt accrual accounting solutions to the public 
sector. Published work on the lobbying of accounting standard setting bodies in respect of 
public sector accounting issues includes the examination of infrastructure assets accounting 
in Australia (Carnegie and West, 1997), the development of Australian accounting standards 
for central and local governments (Ryan, et al, 1999, 2000), the disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration in New Zealand (Baskerville and Newby, 2002) and accounting for the UK 
Private Finance Initiative (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Hodges and Mellett, 2002). These 
studies provide important insights into the application of the existing regulatory process to 
specific public sector accounting proposals in these countries, but they do not provide an 
analysis of the forces that have influenced the structure of the regulatory process itself. A 
further limitation of this type of study is their tendency to identify discrete interest groups 
that are presumed to have an independent influence on the regulatory outcome without 
considering the inter-relationships between them (Miller, 1990). Hodges and Mellett (2005) 
used an interview-based approach to identify more fully the influence of the various actors 
involved in developing an approach to accounting for contracts underpinning the Private 
Finance Initiative in the UK and concluded that the outcome was a compromise that 
maintained the positions and authority of the two main participants, the ASB and the 
Treasury. 
Some researchers have concentrated on a broader (macro-level) analysis of the changes 
in the public sector that have influenced the emergence of related accounting reforms. A 
common theme in many of these studies is the influence of a managerial perspective that 
underlies public sector accounting reforms and that provides evidence of the adoption of 
NPM reforms in the U.K. (for example Humphrey, et al., 1993), Australia (Ryan, 1998), New 
Zealand (McCulloch and Ball, 1992) and internationally (Olson, et al, 1998). The approach 
adopted in this paper is similar to some of these studies in that it examines the broader 
influences on regulatory structure, but we seek to differentiate this paper by drawing upon the 
work of Streeck and Schmitter (1985), as it has been adapted to the accounting regulation 
environment, to provide an analysis of accounting rule-making in the U.K. public sector 
based on modes of social order. The use of Streeck and Schmitter’s work in the accounting 
literature has, to date, concentrated largely on its application to the regulation of private-
sector (corporate) accounting. We extend its application to public sector accounting 
regulation and use their framework to analyse differences in the method of accounting 
regulation between the public and private sectors within a single nation state. This approach 
is based upon an analysis of due process applied in each sector to expose differences in the 
structure of public sector accounting regulation from its private sector counterpart. These 
differences have policy implications that arise from the importance of accounting in 
providing a justification for decision-making in matters of public sector resource allocation. 
The accounting techniques may be transferred from the private sector but we argue that the 
UK public sector accounting regulatory structure remained rooted in the state mode of social 
order, and hence is different from that found in the private sector, despite the rhetoric of 
modernisation through the adoption of private sector management practices. 
The dichotomy between public and private sector accounting regulation has become 
more marked with the private sector move to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) which are now mandatory for listed companies and optional for others. An agenda is 
being pursued by the ASB to bring UK accounting standards in line with international ones 
and the Treasury has decided to align its accounting practices with international ones by 
making revisions as they emerge from the ASB’s convergence programme (FRAB, 2005, p. 
17). This paper concentrates on the period when the government introduced a formal 
approach to developing its accounting policies as this is when the divergence from the private 
sector system that is still seen today was established. 
The next section of the paper gives a description of the Streeck and Schmitter approach 
and the way it has been used in prior accounting research; this is then updated for 
developments that took place in private sector accounting standard setting in the UK prior to 
the introduction of RAB. The third and fourth sections of the paper respectively describe the 
mechanisms of UK public sector accounting regulation and link this to examples of the due 
process operated by the Treasury. Section 5 analyses the public sector using modes of social 
order, based on community, market and state, as a framework for understanding the 
similarities of and differences between approaches to regulation of the public and private 
sectors. The concluding section offers an extension to the classification of mixed systems 
identified by Puxty et al (1987) and Jones (1994) and provides a commentary on the use of 
modes of social order to identify the coexistence of alternative modes of regulation within a 
single nation state. 
MODES OF SOCIAL ORDER 
Streeck and Schmitter (1985; p.1) suggest that the three principles4 of co-ordination 
and allocation which ‘seem to have virtually dominated philosophical speculation and social 
science thought’ are spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition and hierarchical control 
and ‘tend to be identified by the central institution which embodies (and enforces) their 
respective and distinctive guiding principles: the community, the market and the state’ (ibid.). 
We use this model because it provides a framework within which to explore the forces that 
                                                 
4  To maintain consistency we have adopted the following terminology in this paper: ‘model’ means the Social 
Order Model; ‘principles’ refers to the three guiding principles of co-ordination and allocation described as 
‘spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition and hierarchical control’ (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p.1); 
‘institutions’ refers to the related central institutions (ibid.) of community, market and state. 
impact upon the standard setting process in both sectors of the economy. It enables the 
identification of aspects that serve to bring together the sectors as well as those that 
differentiate them. The adoption of NPM by the public sector indicates a policy shift towards 
the market, but the model identifies aspects where, despite the rhetoric, the reality of 
application remains firmly in the state mode. 
An observed social order does not have to be allocated exclusively to any single 
principle. Instead the extant position is seen as coming from the resolution of the forces 
exerted by the three principles acting on a particular scenario. An indicative illustration of the 
positioning of mixed systems of social order derived from these three principles is shown in 
Figure 1. The identification of such mixed systems suggests that the three institutions of 
community, market and state are ‘mutually dependent not mutually exclusive’ (Jones, 1994, 
p.123) and that ‘however dominant any one of these three may have been at a given moment 
and/or for a given set of actors, almost everyone would concede that modern societies / 
polities / economies can only be analysed in terms of some mix of them’ (Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985, pp. 1-2). 
Figure 1: The Resolution of Ordering Institutions (Principles) and the identification of 






























































Sources: adapted from Puxty et al (1987, p.283) and Jones (1994, p. 124) 
 
Examination of the process that creates accounting standards reveals an underlying 
order. In some instances the agendas of the actors are aligned, for example the government 
and the accounting profession may agree on the need to change the public sector accounting 
base from a cash to an accruals model.  In others cases they conflict, for example companies 
will resist the enforced disclosure of information that they believe is damaging to their 
commercial interests. The observed position at any time indicates that an equilibrium position 
has been reached as regards how the rules are set. This equilibrium may prove to be transient 
(for example, Gorelik, 1994; Stoddart, 2000), as shown in the U.K. by the replacement of the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) with the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and 
the creation of a system to produce accounting rules in the public sector as part of the RAB 
agenda. 
An appreciation of the processes of accounting regulation in the two sectors of the 
economy, the private and the public, requires an understanding of the antecedents in terms of 
their development. While a market-driven, laissez-faire ideology may have resulted in the 
existing private sector approach to regulation, the public sector comes from a more rigid, 
hierarchical tradition with the fiscal control exercised by the Treasury being pre-eminent. 
Despite such differences, similarities must also be recognised. Both draw employees from the 
same population, there has been an increasing exchange of individuals between the two 
sectors and both are affected by supra-national bodies such as the European Union and the 
International Federation of Accountants. 
The interplay of the elements of social order contained in the model has been used in 
previous studies to investigate the modes of accounting regulation between countries and 
over time. Puxty, et al (1987) apply the model to accounting regulation in West Germany (as 
it was at the time the paper was written), Sweden, the USA and the UK. They conclude that, 
although the four countries have commonality in that they are all ‘advanced capitalist 
economies in which systematic and persistent patterns of inequality exist between (fractions 
of) capital and labour’ (p. 274) each displays a different approach to accounting regulation 
with the UK being seen to be principally Associationist5 in organisation. Their paper refers to 
public sector accounting only in the case of Sweden, where it notes that ‘there are separate 
regulations for the public sector, local government and private sectors’ (p. 285); such 
                                                 
5  Associationism is described by Puxty at al (1987, p.284) as a mixed mode in which ‘regulation is 
accomplished through the development of organisations that are formed to represent and advance the 
interests of their members. In relation to accountancy, the presence and influence of professional bodies is 
the most obvious example of the strategy of Associationism’. 
divisions also exist in the other countries, but are not brought into the analysis. The social 
order context of accounting and its regulation is highlighted; a single mode of regulation 
cannot be predicted across these countries despite their unifying economic and political 
structures of advanced capitalism. 
Parker (1988) carries out an international comparison of the UK, USA, Australia and 
Canada, identifying the common link between the countries as being that they are all Anglo 
Saxon in their mode of corporate financial reporting. In line with Puxty, et al (1987) he also 
designates the UK as principally Associationist. There is no mention of the public sector. In 
line with the previous study, a common core, in this case the form of financial reporting, does 
not impel the countries towards a common mode of regulation. 
Willmott, et al (1992) apply an approach based on modes of social order to the manner 
in which accounting for research and development expenditure is regulated in four countries. 
They note that countries exhibit differences in the interplay between the forces of dispersed 
competition, hierarchical control and spontaneous solidarity within which the institutional 
arrangements for accounting regulation take place. Although convergence is found as final 
outcomes emerged, their conclusion is that national regulations cannot be fully explained 
through corporatist arrangements and that ‘it may be more appropriate to view each national 
situation as a medium as well as an outcome of a global regulatory process’ (p. 50). In 
contrast to this view of convergent supra-national forces, we identify continuing differences 
between the public and private modes of regulation despite the claimed unifying forces of 
NPM. 
The model has also been used in a historical context to investigate changes in 
accounting regulation over time. Richardson (1989) explores the relationship between the 
corporatist structure of accounting regulation and the internal social order of the Canadian 
accounting profession in Ontario. He concludes (p. 429) that the Streeck and Schmitter model 
can be applied and expanded by examining the forces which affect the origin, reproduction 
and transformation of accounting regulation. However, his paper focuses principally on intra-
professional conflict and solidarity rather than on their relationship to the resulting 
accounting regulation and it does not refer specifically to developments of public sector 
accounting. Jones (1994) concentrates on the line between community and state, plotting the 
changes in accounting regulation at the University of Oxford. He suggests (p.122) that it is 
possible to determine several mixed modes along the community-state axis that he labels 
statutism and grantism6, thus explaining the interactive effects of the modes of social order 
and the possibility of a number of shifting points of resolution as circumstances change. 
Jones and Mellett (forthcoming) use the model to examine accounting for health care over a 
two hundred year period and extend it to include the influence of individuals as catalysts. 
The uses of the Streeck and Schmitter model for international comparisons contain only 
a single passing reference to the public sector while those studies using the model in a 
historical context each deal with activities within a single sector. Hence, this paper’s use of 
the model to identify divergence between the regulation of accounting in the public and 
private sectors of an individual country represents an additional application. This approach 
can help to identify tensions within a single nation state and thus provide an indication of the 
extent to which the NPM agenda has in reality infused the culture of those implementing it. 
Both Puxty et al (1987) and Parker (1988) identify the mode of private sector 
accounting standard setting in the UK to be principally Associationist. There is interaction 
not only within and between members, but also with external parties, such as the state, whose 
involvement is necessary to enforce its outcomes. However, these conclusions require 
modification to encompass subsequent changes under which the Financial Reporting Council 
                                                 
6  Statutism is typified by ad-hoc interventions by government to reorder and restructure administrative and 
financial systems of normally self-governing, autonomous, communitarian institutions. Grantism is typified 
by recurrent government intervention, through an intermediary body, which provides financial aid (Jones, 
1994, pp 122-3). 
(FRC) and its subsidiary, the ASB, became responsible for producing the accounting 
standards which are adapted by the Treasury for public sector application. The ASB is 
recognised under the Companies Act 1985 and took over the task of setting accounting 
standards from the ASC in 1990. It can issue accounting standards on its own authority, 
subject to a majority vote of seven of its ten members. The FRC is also the parent company 
of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) that examines departures from established 
accounting requirements and, if necessary, can seek a court order to remedy them. 
The FRC and its companion bodies are not Government controlled, but are part of a 
private sector process of self regulation and this is reflected in their constitutions, 
membership and financing (FRC, 2001). The dominance of the accounting profession has 
been reduced since 1990 as it now provides only one third of the funding, with the remainder 
split equally between the government and the private sector in the form of listed companies 
and the banking and investment communities. This dilution is reinforced by the presence on 
the council of sufficient members drawn from the corporate sector to reduce the practising 
accountant representation to a minority. The chair and deputy chair of the FRC are both 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Governor of the Bank of 
England. Two members of the FRC council are drawn from the state sector, as well as three 
observers. At the ASB level the corporate sector has four members, the accounting profession 
has three and the state is represented by two observers.  
We suggest that these changes require a re-designation of UK private sector accounting 
regulation, as it existed when RAB was introduced, within the model. The move from the 
ASC to the FRC has introduced legalist aspects to the social ordering of accounting 
regulation in the UK. The machinery remains based on Associationism, but with the 
proportionate contribution of the accounting profession, in terms of both personnel and 
finance, being reduced. There is now a single oversight body that has delegated responsibility 
for the production of accounting standards. There is also legal backing for the compulsory 
revision of accounts where they do not comply with the Companies Acts and accounting 
standards can, as a last resort, be enforced through the courts if other means of coercion are 
not successful. The UK system for regulating private sector accounting through the ASB can 
therefore be described as containing elements of both Associationism and Legalism. These 
changes to UK private sector accounting rule-making systems do not appear to warrant a 
‘corporatist’ reclassification following Puxty et al (1987) as their description includes the 
licensing of the existence of organised interest group such that the state is directly involved in 
the authorisation of candidate members of the accountancy profession (ibid, p.286). An 
additional classification, labelled ‘corporatist associationism’ is included in Figure 1. It is 
positioned closer to the state institution to reflect the increased legal provision supporting a 
system that is still primarily influenced by market forces, but closer to liberalism than 
legalism as the U.K. standard setting arrangements do not involve direct state control over 
membership of the profession. 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONSIDERATIONS 
In the public sector of the UK there is a tradition of self-regulation built around 
accounting procedures that are prescribed in a manner consistent with the bureaucratic nature 
of government organisation. Traditionally, the use of accounting to give visibility to the 
financial aspects of actions was less developed than using it in a technical manner as a control 
mechanism, alongside a budgetary system, to reflect the extent of compliance with the annual 
budget. Emphasis was also placed on procedures to ensure probity. There was awareness of 
developments in private sector approaches to accounting but, historically, there was 
reluctance to adopt them in the public sector. For example, Edwards and Greener (2003) 
identify resistance in the U.K. central government to the adoption of double entry book 
keeping in the early 19th century and Mellett (1992) shows that depreciation was accepted, in 
principle, as an element of cost within the National Health Service (NHS) virtually from its 
inception in 1948, but that it was not introduced universally into its accounts until 1991. In 
contrast, accounting is now used routinely in the public sector to give visibility to previously 
unmeasured accrual-based concepts such as annual surpluses or deficits. 
The history of accounting for activities in the UK public sector, especially those 
undertaken by Central Government, has traditionally been aligned with the state institution of 
Social Order. Amounts of cash were allocated by Parliament to various activities as part of 
the annual budget process. The reports on how these sums had been used were cash-based 
and intended to demonstrate that the cash had been spent on the activities for which it had 
been provided. Hierarchical control was the organisational model, with Central Government 
Departments responsible for overall control passing funds down through the various layers of 
their operations. Procedures were developed for sharing the available cash between 
bureaucratic agencies; in turn, each layer had to account upwards for the cash it received and 
disbursed. 
At the level of central government, there was uniformity in that returns were required 
by the Treasury to account for the cash allocated to each department. However, the 
accounting procedures for individual activities were either given in the Act of Parliament by 
which they were established or delegated to the responsible Minister of State so that, for 
example, the Act of 1948, which created the NHS, allowed the responsible minister to issue 
relevant instructions on accounting7. This approach to control complies with the state 
principle of social order as it covers the provision of collective goods with inclusion 
                                                 
7  A full discussion of the formats and underpinning U.K. public sector accounting reports can be found in 
Henley et al (1986) which deals with the period when the public sector encompassed significant trading 
nationalised industries as well as departments of state. 
established through legal authorisation and authoritative regulation as the product of 
exchange. 
Clear responsibility for the form and content of departmental and whole of government 
resource-based accounts was specified in 2000: ‘Resource accounts shall be prepared in 
accordance with directions issued by the Treasury’ (GRAA, sec. 5.2). The responsibility of 
the Treasury, when issuing guidance, is to ensure that the accounts give a ‘true and fair view’ 
(sec. 5.3.a) and ‘conform to generally accepted accounting practice [GAAP] subject to such 
adaptations as are necessary in the context of departmental accounts’ (sec. 5.3.b). Unlike 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand that have ‘sector-neutral’ standard setting 
bodies, the ASB does not have a remit for setting accounting standards for the public sector 
in the UK8. However the Act does require the Treasury to ‘have regard to any relevant 
guidance issued by the Accounting Standards Board’ (section 5.4.a).  
Each year the Treasury publishes an updated Resource Accounting Manual (RAM) to 
be used by those government departments for which a budget has been approved. The starting 
point in the production of the RAM was to take the extant GAAP and adapt it to public sector 
requirements. To provide the Treasury with independent advice on the development and 
application of financial reporting principles, a Financial Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB) 
was established in 1996 and subsequently became the body that the Treasury has to consult to 
comply with s24 of the GRAA. One of the main tasks of the FRAB is to review the RAM 
and, if appropriate, to approve it. The FRAB also considers proposed changes that may 
                                                 
8  The ASB has established a ‘Public Sector and Not-for-Profit Committee’ with membership drawn from the 
accounting profession (5 members), the public sector (5 members plus one observer), academia (2 members) 
and the charity sector (1 member plus 1 observer from the Charity Commission). This committee acts as a 
specialist advisor for Statements of Recommended Practice (SORPs) relating to the not-for-profit sector, 
currently these cover local authority accounting, higher education institutions and charities. The ASB does 
not itself issue SORPs, but recognises outside bodies for that purpose. As a condition of that recognition, 
SORPs must include a negative assurance statement outlining the limited role of the ASB and the absence of 
conflict with any fundamental accounting practice or standard. 
originate from experience or developments arising as a consequence of new standards coming 
from the ASB. 
FRAB’s has terms of reference were drawn up by the Treasury in consultation with the 
National Audit Office and it initially had nine members, plus a chairman, an accountant who 
has pursued a career in industry. The Board initially comprised a chairman, drawn from 
industry, and nine members, seven drawn from a range of public sector organisations, one 
from academia, who specialised in public sector accounting and economics, and one from a 
big-four accounting firm who also chaired the Public Sector and Not-for-Profit sub-
committee of the ASB9. Since its formation the FRAB has lobbied successfully for an 
extension to its remit. In its first report on the RAM it expressed the possibility of its remit 
being extended to cover the principles and standards applied to all central government bodies 
(FRAB, 1997, p.13) and subsequently to Non-Departmental Public Bodies and trading funds 
with the possibility of further extension to take in NHS Trusts and the policies underlying 
whole of government accounts (FRAB, 1999, p. 13). These extensions, other than the NHS 
proposal, were noted as having taken place the following year (FRAB, 2000, p. 2). Its next 
report referred to continuing discussions with the NHS and the possibility of its remit being 
extended to Scotland and Northern Ireland (FRAB, 2001, p.3) while a subsequent report 
(FRAB, 2002) confirmed that its remit has been extended as envisaged. 
 
DUE PROCESS
Due process may be linked, in the UK context, with the idea of procedural fairness and 
encompassed within the concept of natural justice (Galligan, 1996, p. 73). When applied to 
the process by which accounting standards are developed, it is possible to differentiate 
‘procedural due process’ (whereby the rule maker must give constituents the opportunity to 
                                                 
9  Membership has subsequently grown to 14 with the inclusion of additional public sector representatives. 
advance and defend their arguments) and ‘substantive due process’ (whereby a rule-making 
body must give adequate justification or rationale for each promulgated standard)’ (Shapiro, 
1998, p. 642). The fact that procedural due process operates does not mean that responsibility 
for decision-making is passed to those outside the system who decide to participate. They can 
contribute and their input be given due weight, but the final decision rests with the designated 
authority which justifies its decisions through substantive due process. ‘Due process suggests 
that interested parties cannot always win but can expect to have their arguments heard’ 
(Fogarty, et al, 1992, p. 29). 
Streeck and Schmitter do not identify due process as a property of the ordering 
principles, but it can be related to the model and used to examine the extent to which the U.K. 
system of public sector accounting rule-making differs from its private sector counterpart. 
Due process must exist to satisfy the principal communitarian decision rules of ‘common 
consent’ and ‘unanimous agreement’, although it may be operated in an informal manner so 
that all members of the community can participate. Without due process, communitarian 
solidarity could not be achieved, as its absence would undermine the extent to which the 
members could create a shared affective existence and distinctive collective identity. It is also 
important in the Associationist mode to aid the creation of pacts and the decision rules using 
parity representation, proportional adjustment and concurrent consent. The absence of due 
process from the state principle is consistent with its use of authoritative formal adjudication 
and imperative certification; these do not sit easily with the idea of involving ‘outsiders’ – 
that is the ruled and subordinates - in the process. 
Walker and Robinson (1993) identify the stages through which an accounting standard 
passes during its development; these are outlined in Figure 2 and can be used to assess the 
extent to which procedural due process is operated in the public sector. Due process can also 
be used to identify the social order properties that are manifested in its operation. Should a 
private sector standard be transferred to the UK public sector without modification, then the 
only due process it will have passed through is that operated by the ASB. 
 
Figure 2: The Standard Setting Process and its Constituent Stages 
Process Stages 
Entrance to the Agenda of the 
rule-making body.  
1. Issue emerges and gains admission to the 
agenda of the rule-making body. 
2. Discussion memo or paper drafted & released. 
3. Exposure draft(s) prepared & released. 
4. Open hearings and working parties. 
 
Formal consideration of Agenda 
Items by the rule-making body. 
5. Standard prepared, approved & issued. 
Post-Enactment Review 6. Assessment of the impact of the approved 
standard.  
 
Source: Walker and Robinson (1993, p. 7) 
 
Developing accounting procedures for the UK public sector in the context of RAB 
effectively takes place within a closed loop. The Treasury is responsible for producing the 
Resource Accounting Manual (RAM), which is referred to FRAB for comment. The Treasury 
therefore has control over the entry of an issue to the public sector accounting standard 
setting agenda and the iterative nature of its relationship with the FRAB, together with an 
emphasis that the Treasury is responsible for issuing accounting directions, is repeatedly 
present in FRAB reports (e.g. FRAB, 2000, p. 13). The RAM specifies not only the 
applicable accounting standards, revised in some cases, but also the detailed accounting 
policies to be used. The Treasury is also able to specify accounting requirements to 
departments, trading funds and Non Departmental Public Bodies through issuing what are 
known as ‘Dear Accounting Officer’ letters. This extent of specification in the public sector 
is additional evidence of centralised control and is consistent with the state institution in 
which ‘the emphasis is on control with accounting systems perhaps being control based, 
standardized and relatively unresponsive to change’ (Jones, 1994, p.122). This contrasts with 
the private sector in which reporting entities are able to determine their own accounting 
policies within the more general requirements of accounting standards which gives the 
potential for variety between companies in the accounting treatment of similar, or even 
identical, economic events. 
However, there are external influences as UK GAAP, in the form of the output of the 
ASB, is the starting point for the accounting standards operated in the public sector and this 
means that public-sector agenda entrance can be triggered by the issue of a new (private-
sector) standard. Where an issue emerges in the private sector, it will go through the ASB 
process with an implicit understanding that it will subsequently be considered for application 
in the public sector. The ASB notes that accounting standards for entities in the public sector 
are a ‘matter for the legislation governing the bodies concerned’ (FRC, 2001, p. 5). In these 
circumstances, submissions to the ASB that attempt to make the standard under consideration 
applicable to the public sector, at the expense of its relevance to the private sector, should 
have no influence. The absence of a link between involvement and outcome removes the 
possibility of public sector related due process operating in the production of ASB standards. 
New ASB standards are therefore considered by the FRAB and might be incorporated 
in the RAM without amendment, in which case there is an absence of due process from the 
viewpoint of the public sector. Alternatively, a dissonance between the use of a standard 
produced by the ASB for the private sector and its application in the public sector may be 
identified, notwithstanding that public sector entities may have made representations to the 
ASB during its development. For example, the ASB issued FRS 11 ‘Impairment of Fixed 
Assets and Goodwill’ in 1998 following a Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) in 
1997 (ASB, 1997a). The published submissions to the FRED include a single public sector 
response from the National Audit Office (ASB, 1997b, pp. 221-223). It points out the 
problems likely to be encountered when attempting to determine the ‘value in use’ of assets 
that are not of the income generating type, such as national monuments or parks; this reduces 
the valuation decision to a comparison of net realisable value and replacement cost10. This 
potential problem is not addressed by the subsequent accounting standard, although the 
FRAB allowed FRS 12 to be incorporated into the Resource Accounting Manual in its 
entirety (FRAB, 1999, p. 11). 
Problems associated with the identification of value in use in the public sector arose 
again with FRS 15 ‘Tangible Fixed Assets’ (ASB, 1999). In this case the FRAB reported that 
it approved the incorporation of the FRS into the Resource Accounting Manual but required a 
‘not for profit’ interpretation to be put on recoverable amount in cases of a revaluation loss to 
below depreciated historical cost (FRAB, 2000, p. 8). 
After a matter has been placed on the agenda, there is no specified route to convert 
proposals into requirements other than through the FRAB mechanism: ‘Treasury will be 
responsible for making amendments to the Manual as required, after taking advice from the 
Financial Reporting Advisory Board to the Treasury’ (Treasury, 2001, par. 1.10.2). Once the 
Treasury has put the RAM before the Board, any suggested changes are either agreed with 
the Treasury representative at the meeting or taken back to the Treasury for further 
consideration. Therefore stages 2 to 5 inclusive in Figure 2 do not have a rigid specification 
and will not necessarily involve any external consultation. The Treasury takes the lead role 
and might ask for comments on its proposals, as was the case with the initial idea to move to 
RAB (Treasury, 1994, p. iv). Requests for comments on specific proposals are on an ad-hoc 
basis and they may be limited to other governmental organisations or may not be widely 
                                                 
10  Although only a single representation from the public sector is included in the published responses, it is 
noted elsewhere that ‘The NHS Executive and Treasury took advantage of the consultation period to provide 
their comments on the drafts [of FRS 11 and 12] to the [Accounting Standards] Board’ (NAO, 2000, p. 
R18). These representations, although not publicly available, seem also to have had no discernible effect on 
the final accounting standard. 
circulated. For example, a Treasury Task Force (TTF) undertook a revision of its technical 
note11 on how to account for the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) following the publication of 
related ASB proposals. The draft of the revised technical note appeared on its web-site on 8th 
January 1999 with an introduction asking individuals or organisations to comment by 25th 
January. This two-week period for exposure and comment provides a stark contrast to the 
three months provided by the ASB for comments on its related exposure draft. A further 
difference in due process between the ASB and the Treasury is the (non) availability of 
copies of the written comments on the accounting proposals. The ASB make available all of 
the written comments on exposure drafts except when an individual commentator has 
requested anonymity12, the Treasury does not make available the equivalent comments on its 
proposals. Access is also impeded because the minutes of FRAB are not available on 
request13.  
The relative paucity of due process measures within the Treasury / FRAB system, 
compared to that of the ASB, can perhaps best be explained by the differences in the structure 
and authority of the respective bodies. The ASB, having been established as a private sector 
standard setter and being financed largely through contributions from listed companies and 
the accounting profession, must continually re-establish its authority and seeks to do this 
partly through a relatively transparent process in which individuals, organisations and firms 
may have their say (Fogarty et al, 1992). In contrast, the authority of the Treasury is beyond 
dispute; it may look to obtain the views and perhaps the consent of other parts of government 
but its existence and authority is not threatened by the absence of due process in matters of 
public sector accounting standard-setting. The FRAB is able to provide a medium for formal 
                                                 
11  The original Technical Note was issued without formal outside consultation. 
12  The ASB comment letters provide the basis for subsequent independent analysis of which there are many 
examples in the literature (for example, in the case of PFI see Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Hodges and 
Mellett, 2002). 
13  Written response to the authors received 25 April 2001. 
consultation on these matters without the necessity of opening up debate beyond the 
relatively narrow confines of government.  
The final stage in the process of developing accounting standards comprises a review of 
their operation. For example, FRAB (2001, p. 1) states that ‘The board attached considerable 
importance to the Manual being fully reviewed as practical experience is gained of its 
operation’ while noting that ‘the review resulted in few substantial amendments’. Given the 
novelty of introducing private sector accounting techniques to the public sector it is not 
surprising that a process of regular review has been established. We raise two concerns with 
this process. The first is that the review appears to have been dominated by issues around the 
practical application of the RAM on issues such as the availability of accurate records to meet 
the Manual’s requirements (Public Accounts Committee, 2000; NAO, 2001). While these are 
issues of practical importance they have overshadowed and eclipsed concerns over the 
appropriateness of individual accounting policies. As a result there appears to have been little 
if any review of whether or not these accounting policies, which have been developed in the 
private sector and transferred en-bloc into the public sector, are the most appropriate for 
reflecting public sector financial performance. Our second concern is that there appears to be 
little involvement of organizations or individuals from outside the public sector in the 
standard setting process; an inevitable outcome of the lack of structured due process. 
 
CLASSIFYING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
To pursue our consideration of whether NPM has aligned the modes of social order 
identified with the regulation of accounting in the two sectors, we now discuss the 
classification of the UK’s public sector accounting regulatory regime using concepts of 
community, market and state. None of these institutions exist in a pure form and so we 
theorise that the point of resolution is an amalgam that exhibits features from all three. 
Hierarchical control is seen in the accounting regimes of both the private and public 
sectors as each has a super-ordinate body (ASB / Treasury) that issues the accounting rules 
(in the form of an FRS or the RAM) to be applied by sub-ordinate bodies. Communitarian 
principles exist where there are groups, such as professional accountants and civil servants, 
who have internal allegiances and comply with the behavioural norms of their respective 
‘clans’. Private sector accounting is based on market ideals and is influenced by corporations 
and institutions through established due process procedures and other forms of lobbying and 
persuasion. Public sector accounting practices might also be seen to exhibit features of the 
market institution of social order. Streeck and Schmitter, (1985, p. 4) suggest that the market 
may be used to explain ‘competitive interaction between political parties in pursuit of voter 
preferences in democratic elections’ as well the competitive allocation of goods and services 
according to consumer preferences. In other words, politicians may be in a ‘market for votes’. 
However, it seems unlikely that there are many votes linked directly to the reform of public 
sector accounting procedures and the RAB project did not feature in the manifesto of either 
the Labour or Conservative parties in the 2001, or subsequent,  general elections14. The 
apparent lack of general public interest in the reform of public sector accounting regulation is 
consistent with U.K. research studies (e.g. Butterworth, et al, 1989; Jones, 1992).  
RAB is intended to infuse all of the government apparatus and so will be used both in 
management accounting to indicate the resources consumed to deliver programmes and for 
external reporting as part of the process of accountability. Many actors are involved, directly 
or indirectly, including the civil servants who operate the internal mechanisms, the taxpayers 
                                                 
14  One of the few differences between the two parties in this regard was that the Conservatives set up a Shadow 
National Accounts Commission, which in its final report (SNAC, 2000) recommended the creation of a 
National Accounts Commission as an independent body alongside the ASB. Apart from some negative 
responses to its report, nothing has been heard of it since. 
who pay for the programmes and the electorate. Within the state sector the guiding principle 
is that of hierarchy with the Treasury being the predominant actor and so regulation of public 
sector accounting procedures is consistent with the state institution of social order as outlined 
by Streeck and Schmitter (1985, p. 5). 
The influence of the state institution can also been seen from the enabling conditions 
for entry and inclusion that are provided by legal authorisation, with statute specifying the 
structures within which internal actors must operate. The law also underpins internal 
oversight through FRAB, which, although not specified by name, has a legal basis for its 
existence as a consultative body (GRAA, sec. 24). The Act also provides an enabling 
condition for external actors, as it requires the Treasury to ‘have regard to any relevant 
guidance issued by the Accounting Standards Board’ (sec. 5(4)). Using an Act of Parliament 
to underpin RAB is consistent with coercion being the medium of exchange as it requires the 
use of rules set by the Treasury, thus making authoritative regulation the principal product of 
exchange. The Act gives the Treasury, through its expertise and role in establishing what 
constitutes procedural correctness, legitimate control over the means of coercion and further 
control is established by requiring the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine 
departmental resource accounts (sec. 6). Some similarity with the private sector may be seen 
here as the activities of the ASB were given legal backing. However this legal authorisation 
did not extend to the ASB having the right to prescribe the accounting policies of individual 
companies, which remain the responsibility of the directors. This can be contrasted with the 
power of the Treasury to appoint an accounting officer to each department (GRAA, sec. 5(6)) 
through whom control is exercised. 
The principal motive(s) of super-ordinate actors is deemed to be career advancement 
and bureaucratic stability within the state institution (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985. pp. 5-6). 
The adoption of RAB has opened new areas of potential advancement for accountants 
working in or on behalf of the public sector. Bureaucratic stability is sought through the rule-
based nature of accounting, especially as it is being applied in the RAM; the manual is being 
written as prescriptively as possible to minimise the opportunity for creative accounting. Sub-
ordinate actors, operating in a rule-based environment, may have a fear of punishment if they 
do not comply, but this is tempered if employees feel they have a ‘reasonably secure job’ 
(Wooldridge, 2001, p. 11).  
There is a similarity with the private sector here as a theme of those responsible for the 
RAB project is that they expect it to improve the control of resources. It should maximise 
predictability as it contributes to a more ‘business-like approach with a strong emphasis on 
business planning’ (ibid. p. 20). This suggests that communitarian esteem and shared group 
values should not be overlooked as motivational forces behind the transfer of NPM. There is 
a mutual interest of accountants in both sectors to support the increased visibility of 
accounting and financial issues in the public sector. The promotion of accrual-based 
accounting methods in the public sector may provide opportunities for career enhancement of 
accounting staff and enable easier transferability between the two sectors. 
Decision rules and modal goods are closely aligned with the state mode. The rules 
cover the operation of the accounting process and are overseen by the Treasury with 
reference to the ASB and FRAB. The Treasury makes an authoritative adjudication where 
alternative accounting approaches exist, the formality of which is confirmed by its inclusion 
in the RAM. Imperative certification of the RAM comes from its approval by the FRAB, and 
the output of the process is scrutinised by the Comptroller and Auditor General (GRAA, sec. 
6). The modal type of goods produced can be viewed as either tangible or intangible. 
Tangible goods include the various accounting and financial reports and intangible benefits 
may derive from the contribution that accounting makes to control procedures. Both of these 
are collective goods as their purpose is to enable the government to fulfil its side of the 
compact between it and the electorate. They provide benefits to a large group of people and 
are not responsive to market forces in that they are provided centrally. There is no way, other 
than taxation, of enforcing payment for them, nor is there a way of withholding their benefit 
from non-payers. 
The principal line of cleavage observed in the accounting standard setting process 
remains that between the rulers and the ruled, that is, the cleavage observed in the state mode 
of social order. This contention is evidenced by the lack of due process in converting the 
output of the ASB into accounting standards to be applied in the public sector. Other 
cleavages indicative of the state institution are also found in the process, with the Treasury in 
the superior position and other departments being subordinate; the RAM is designed to be 
prescriptive and so prevent the development of alternative accounting policies by reporting 
entities. The ordering of the relationship between superior and subordinate actors is based on 
a normative legal foundation using formal administrative procedures, again a feature of the 
state model. However, tensions identified in the community may also be present, when, for 
example, a dispute arises over the application of an accounting rule, as happened in the 
Ministry of Defence where officials sought to exploit accounting rules to obtain extra cash 
(Baldwin and Evans, 2004). Such an eventuality could be viewed as clan rivalry, but is likely 
to be settled by authoritative imposition. 
Similar lines of cleavage may be observed in the private sector where companies are 
required to comply with approved financial reporting standards. The principal difference 
between the two sectors lies in the less prescriptive nature of the ASB standards compared to 
the rules that are applied within the public sector. The ASB is unlikely to develop accounting 
standards that are unacceptable to its main constituents, partly as a result of its own due 
process procedures that enable views to be identified prior to the approval of standards.     
Finally, the potential payoffs can be considered. The codification of accounting practice 
contained in the RAM may be seen as an attempt to provide equitable and predictable 
treatment. It is ‘equitable’ because it is enforced by the Treasury on all government 
departments and other entities that are subject to the RAM and it is ‘predictable’ in the 
context that all such departments and other entities must comply with the adopted accounting 
standards, policies and other prescribed regulations15.   Where particular accounting issues 
arise, they can be referred to the Treasury for consideration and, if necessary, a policy can be 
developed for inclusion in the RAM. Such an approach is equitable insofar as it appears to 
apply the same policies to every reporting entity; none can achieve an advantage by adopting 
accounting procedures that show it in a relatively better light. For example, all departments 
have to revalue fixed assets in the prescribed manner. This structure also provides 
predictability in treatment through codified rules, although not necessarily in the reported 
financial results. In alignment with the precepts of NPM, the policy is also expected to 
deliver the market ideal of material prosperity by enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in 
the public sector. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We conclude that UK public sector accounting standard setting contains features of 
state, market and community institutions. While the starting point for UK public sector 
standards is based upon UK GAAP, as expressed by the ASB, the state has significant powers 
to amend or avoid application of specific regulations. On this basis the state mode of social 
                                                 
15  These are somewhat restricted uses of the words ‘equitable’ and ‘predictable’. We do not suggest that the use 
of accrual-based accounting statements will necessarily provide an ‘equitable’ allocation of resources 
between social groups or government-funded organizations; nor do we consider here the possibility that the 
adoption of accrual-based accounting is part of a more general process of the ‘Hollowing Out of the State’ 
(Rhodes, 1994). The ‘predicable’ accounting policies to be adopted from the RAM do not imply that the 
reported financial results will necessarily be predictable. Indeed, the inclusion of asset revaluations, capital 
charges and other accrual-based adjustments may lead to more volatile financial results than under a cash-
based accounting regime. 
order takes precedence over that of the market and community. The system retains 
associationist features but these are subservient to etatism. We have labelled this mixed mode 
of social order as ‘etatist associationism’ in figure 1. It is positioned closer to the state than 
‘corporatist associationism’ to reflect the greater influence of the state and the corresponding 
lesser influence of market and community. Relative to corporatism, it is closer to the 
market/state axis as it does not rely upon state registration of community groups such as the 
accounting profession.  
As part of its agenda, NPM exhibits the ‘desire to replace the presumed inefficiency of 
hierarchical bureaucracy with the presumed efficiency of markets’ (Power, 1997, p.43) and, 
within this, there has been a movement to align UK public sector accounting practices more 
closely with those found in the private sector. This has resulted in highly visible changes to 
the rules of public sector accounting, which now largely mimic those of the private sector. 
However, the process of formulating those rules does not correspond with that found in the 
private sector. This presents a dichotomy to be explored in the context of the social structures 
that gave rise to the alternative approaches. 
Private sector accounting standards in the UK, and the method of their production, 
derives from the role of accounting as ‘a set of calculative practices for comprehending and 
representing economic transactions …[it] … directly affects the appropriation of surplus 
value and is used symbolically to celebrate economic rationality in decision making’ (Booth 
and Cocks, 1990, p. 517). Such as underpinning does not exist in the public sector and this 
paper has argued that consideration of the modes of social order, when viewed through the 
lens of due process, identifies a cultural divide that continues to exist between the public and 
private sectors, at least in the context of developing accounting standards. The state mode is 
identified as that applicable to the manner in which accounting practices are regulated in the 
UK public sector. This remains so despite the rhetoric of assimilation of private sector 
managerial practices. 
The aims of representing economic transactions and seeking economic rationality are 
also present in the public sector, but the identification and appropriation of economic 
surpluses are absent. There is no single ‘bottom line’ because public sector outputs such as 
education, defence and health, are intangible and not capable of consistent, meaningful 
economic representation. Accounting is becoming implicated in the construction of different 
views of the problematic, the desirable and the possible (Hopwood, 1984, p. 171) but the 
process of rule-making remains under state control and so the steering mechanisms provided 
by accounting might reveal only what the Treasury deems to be appropriate. 
Deviation from the private sector approach to standard setting is particularly 
demonstrated in the context of due process where the UK public sector lacks participation 
and transparency. While NPM may seek ‘financial transparency, the autonomization of 
organizational sub-units, the decentralisation of management authority, … and the 
enhancement of accountability to customers’ (Power, 1997, p. 43), the model adopted admits 
the likelihood that the public sector is more akin to a corporate group than a number of 
separate, independent entities. The government, through the Treasury, has dominant 
economic influence over all of the other parts for which RAB provides the internal 
accountings. Cash is the bottom line for the Treasury and so, even if there is compliance with 
such accounting practices as provisioning and capital charging, substantial cash surpluses or 
deficits will not be allowed to accrue at subordinate levels. Booth and Cocks (1990, p. 517) 
state that ‘in the main, accounting standards will be produced that support and reflect the 
prevailing hegemony’; to do this requires control over the means of producing those 
standards. The Treasury continues to maintain that control in the public sector, subject to the 
advisory role of FRAB. 
The recognition of the Treasury’s influential role does not, however, cause the system 
of U.K. public sector accounting standard setting to be designated as legalism following 
Puxty at al (1987). Market and community still retain influence over U.K. public sector 
accounting.  
The direct influence of the market comes through the use of UK (private sector) GAAP 
as the starting point of the RAM. After review by the FRAB, private sector standards will 
often be adopted without amendment in the RAM; this has been the case with most of the 
ASB standards. Alternatively the rules may be amended or re-interpreted for adoption in the 
public sector; for example in the case of accounting for the Private Finance Initiative 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). While ‘the State “leans” on interest groupings to achieve 
“public” as contrasted with “private” purposes’ (Puxty et al., 1987, p.284) it cannot be certain 
that the outcome from the private sector accounting standard-setting process will satisfy its 
own objectives; hence the need to maintain and control a separate public sector one.  
The influence of community may appear to be insignificant in this process, being 
‘routinely subordinated to those of the Market’ (ibid). However communitarian principles 
may still have a subtle influence over the more explicitly powerful market and state forces. It 
was suggested earlier in the paper that the ASB needed to continually re-establish its 
authority by providing extensive due process in which individuals, organisations and firms 
may have their say. The role of the FRAB within the public sector accounting standard 
setting system continues to develop as it has sought to extend its remit beyond the narrow 
confines of the RAM. It too must establish its existing authority within the Treasury and to 
Parliament and seeks to do so by establishing procedures within the public sector and by 
promoting itself externally through its public domain reports. A feature common to the ASB 
and FRAB is that continuation and extension of their roles depends, at least partially, upon 
the support of communities such as the accounting profession, the civil service and members 
of parliament. They are organisations that must be seen to retain a semblance of 
independence from market and state influences to justify their self-promotion as providers of 
an independent assessment of accounting proposals. From this perspective the ASB and 
FRAB should be seen not as separate parts of competing rule-making systems but as having a 
symbiotic relationship; both provide a potential for communitarian influence in the face of 
super-ordinate forces. This relationship depends partly upon allowing each body to confirm 
and extend its own regulatory space (Young, 1994) while avoiding a direct conflict between 
the private and public sector systems of accounting rule-making. The movement to accrual-
based accounting in the public sector has enabled the two bodies to be supportive of each 
others work, at least at the level of general principles of accounting. For example, the FRAB 
(2002, p. 9) welcomed the planned publication by the ASB of an interpretation of the 
Statement of Principles for application by public sector and not-for-profit entities (ASB, 
2003). 
A possible concluding issue is whether more of the private sector approach, in the form 
of enhanced due process, should be introduced to the public sector. There is no practical 
reason why the production of public sector accounting standards should not be opened up to 
public participation and so introduce scrutiny and contribution. This is especially so given 
that allowing ‘outsiders’ to participate in the process does not give them authority, merely the 
opportunity to contribute to the debate. Such a move would be consistent with ‘empowering 
the people’, a theme running through government policy, for example, in the creation of 
Foundation NHS Trusts16. Enabling those to whom the government is accountable to 
participate in developing financial aspects of that accountability would contribute towards 
satisfying the requirements of procedural due process. Substantive due process would also be 
                                                 
16  Foundation NHS Trusts remain within the NHS but have been established as independent public benefit 
corporations modelled on co-operative and mutual traditions and are intended to have substantial financial 
and operational freedom from centralised direction (Department of Health, 2003). 
improved by requiring adequate justification for decisions to be given, including an 
explanation of why particular submissions, or the approach they advocate, has been accepted 
or rejected. Without such opportunities to participate, outsiders are left only with indirect 
means of attempting to influence public sector accounting regulations; perhaps through their 
own Member of Parliament, through professional organisations who may have access at an 
appropriate level, by ad-hoc letters to the FRAB or the Treasury in the hope that someone 
may take note of a particular concern or through media releases and published articles that 
may come to the attention of an ‘insider’. 
We have focused our attention on the UK but, at the international level, there would 
appear, intuitively, to be a different nexus of forces that apply in those countries which adopt 
a regulatory structure of ‘sector-neutral’ standard setting, those in which the public sector 
accounting standard setter is outside of direct government control and those in which 
government accounting standard setting may be more heavily influenced by professional 
accounting bodies17. A comparative approach, exploring the impact of globalization (Everett, 
2003) and incorporating the influence of trans-national organisations such as the IASB and 
the IFAC not-for-profit committee, would be a challenging extension to existing work using 
the Streeck and Schmitter framework.  
This study has provided a comparative analysis of public and private sector accounting 
regulation within a single state based upon modes of social order. It has reflected on the 
extent to which NPM has permeated the regulation of public sector accounting. Even though 
NPM seeks to introduce to the public sector ‘a cluster of ideas borrowed from the conceptual 
framework of private sector administrative practice’ (Power, 1997, p. 43), our analysis 
suggests that, despite the rhetoric of adopting private sector practices, the centralising 
                                                 
17  A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bolton, 2006) reports the extent to which IFRS are used in 
different countries for listed, unlisted and public sector entities. Adoption ranges from ‘mandatory’ in all 
three cases through virtually all combinations to ‘prohibited’ in all three cases. 
instincts of the state by means of bureaucratic control remain intact. We conclude that NPM, 
in this aspect of UK accounting, has not yet overcome the historical and cultural differences 
inherent in the two sectors. 
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